Metaphysics of Human Rights: Human Interest as Part of the Natural World

Description

This paper begins with a discussion of the two main models of value judgment: the "taste model" and the "rational preference model."
According to the first model, value judgments are a matter of taste or attitude, that is, everyone has his or her own opinion; and, I have mine. Each opinion can only be corrected, either by questions of fact, or by questions of logical validity. Regardless of such verification, there are no rational criteria to judge the superiority of one value over another. Thus, value judgments, unlike judgments of fact, have no truth value associated with them, and their origin is purely subjective; therefore, they are mere expressions of taste or individual attitude.
The second model, which is based on R. Brandt's original version improved by J. Griffins (2015), proposes that values stem from desires and that desires can be considered "rational" if their content persists after consideration of all the "natural facts", about that desire, and once they have been purged of all logical errors. This model believes that "true" human interests are born of rational desires, which, rather than "taste models," have an objective basis that is found in the intentional matter of the "desire" itself, which is ultimately grounded in the external natural world.
Following the discussion of these two models of value judgment, the paper turns to the problem of human interest as something that can be grounded in the Natural World. Finally, it examines the extent to which the epistemic and metaphysical dimension of human interests is consonant with the ethical and political idea of "human rights," which would ultimately be grounded in the Natural World.

Period	10 Feb 2022
Event title	IV Congresso Internacional de Pedagogia: Educação, Justiça e Direitos Humanos num Mundo em Transformação
Event type	Conference
Conference number	4
Organiser	Faculty of Philosophy and Social Sciences
Location	Braga, PortugalShow on map