A constitutional theory of intergenerational equity

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapterpeer-review

Abstract

Taking cue from the honoree’s lifelong interest in constitutional issues, interdisciplinary research, and intergenerational equity, this chapter presents and assesses the case for constitutional precommitments as means to correct the short-termist bias of democracy. It discusses two different forms that rationality-securing precommitment can take—mechanical and fiduciary—and argues that the former (rules) cannot accommodate reasonable pluralism with respect to intergenerational justice, hence jeopardizing constitutional legitimacy. As to the latter (principles), while it may be able to reconcile rationality and pluralism, the standard method for its enforcement—judicial review—is unfit for the task within the realm of intergenerational issues. That calls for a different type of constitutional arrangement, and therefore a renewal of interest in institutional imagination and design.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationEconomic globalization and governance
Subtitle of host publicationessays in Honor of Jorge Braga de Macedo
EditorsLuís Brites Pereira, Maria Eugénia Mata, Miguel Rocha de Sousa
Place of PublicationCham
PublisherSpringer
Pages281-301
Number of pages21
ISBN (Electronic)9783030532659
ISBN (Print)9783030532642
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 16 Oct 2020

Keywords

  • Constitutional precommitments
  • Financial freedom
  • Institutional design
  • Intergenerational equity
  • Political economy

Fingerprint

Dive into the research topics of 'A constitutional theory of intergenerational equity'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this