A filosofia da religião de David Hume: teísmo, ateísmo ou deísmo?

In his philosophy of religion, David Hume makes the distinction between genuine theism, that corresponds to the affirmation that the entire structure of nature indicates a Supreme Being, an intelligent designer and creator of order in the world, and superstitious theism, that corresponds to the belief in idolatrous polytheism based on the servile and familiar actions of superior powers described in an anthropomorphic form, with human passions and appetites, members and organs. From this distinction, we aim to demonstrate that the work of this author does not put at stake the essential religious truth in what concerns as regards the existence of God, which emerges to reason as obvious, but instead questions the anthropomorphic conception of divine attributes and its cognoscible appropriateness as well as the way in which religions conceive their providential relationship with their creatures on the scope of supreme justice and the enactment of a perfect future of integral redemption. It is only possible to affirm the divine cause from inferences o that are taken out from the experience that we make of its effects. Hence, we do not consider that his position falls under the auspices of atheism, in the etymologic meaning of the term, but rather represents deism in the sense of rationally inferring based upon the effects of a Divinity existence as the ultimate cause for the entire extent of the natural order, without which it’s impossible a philo sophical comprehension of its incommensurable essentiality leaving to obscure and contradictory discourse to the domain of faith.