This paper is divided in three parts. The first part addresses the main tenets of Husserl’s conception of formal logic, its different levels and its relationship with formal mathematics and formal ontology. It will, therefore, undertake a delimitation of the logical domain, in its autonomy, taking as its point of departure the presentation Husserl makes of this subject in his works of maturity, particularly in Formale und transzendentale Logik. The second part shows why, for phenomenology, the analysis of objective logical configurations has to be completed by a subjective analysis of the intentional achievements in which these configurations have their genesis. In other words, we will try to ground such an autonomy in the very nature of logical reason. Finally, the third and last part, following the text of the first two sections of Erfahrung und Urteil, addresses the roots of the logical-categorical activity in the ante-predicative passive experience.
|Publication status||Published - 2010|