@article{39278e808e6243019f7a74ec52f30825,
title = "A note on the wallet game with discrete bid levels",
abstract = "It is well-known that in the wallet game with two bidders, bidding twice the (individual) signal is an equilibrium. We prove that this strategy is never an equilibrium in a Japanese–English auction once discrete bid levels are introduced; we also discuss the implications of this result.",
keywords = "Discrete bids, Japanese–English auctions, Wallet game",
author = "Ricardo Gon{\c c}alves and Indrajit Ray",
note = "Funding Information: We wish to thank seminar and conference participants at Aveiro, Bristol, Coimbra, Glasgow, Jadavpur, Lisbon, New Delhi, Warwick, York and in particular, Bhaskar Dutta, Francoise Forges, Peter Hammond, Ron Harstad, Paul Klemperer, Fabio Michelucci and Stephen Morris for many helpful comments, as well as Steve Farrar (Looe Fish Selling) for invaluable insights. We are also grateful to an anonymous referee of this journal for many constructive suggestions that helped us to prepare this revised version. Financial support from Funda{\c c}{\~a}o para a Ci{\^e}ncia e Tecnologia (through project UID/GES/00731/2013) and the British Academy/Leverhulme small research grant (SG153381) is gratefully acknowledged. Ray also acknowledges the hospitality received at the Indian Statistical Institute, Kolkata where part of the work on this paper was done during his visit. Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 2017 The Authors",
year = "2017",
month = oct,
doi = "10.1016/j.econlet.2017.07.032",
language = "English",
volume = "159",
pages = "177--179",
journal = "Economics Letters",
issn = "0165-1765",
publisher = "Elsevier B.V.",
}