A note on the wallet game with discrete bid levels

Ricardo Gonçalves, Indrajit Ray*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

2 Citations (Scopus)
10 Downloads

Abstract

It is well-known that in the wallet game with two bidders, bidding twice the (individual) signal is an equilibrium. We prove that this strategy is never an equilibrium in a Japanese–English auction once discrete bid levels are introduced; we also discuss the implications of this result.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)177-179
Number of pages3
JournalEconomics Letters
Volume159
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Oct 2017

Keywords

  • Discrete bids
  • Japanese–English auctions
  • Wallet game

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