Abstract
Larry Alexander argues that first-order reasoning tells us both that we need rules to be followed and that we should not follow rules. Herein lies ‘the gap’, a problem that he finds intractable. I argue that the problem is real but also manageable, and offer reasons to resist an extreme form of legal skepticism.
| Translated title of the contribution | Entre a legalidade e a anarquia: comentário ao ensaio de Larry Alexander sobre direito e política |
|---|---|
| Original language | English |
| Pages (from-to) | 13-21 |
| Number of pages | 9 |
| Journal | E-Pública |
| Volume | 5 |
| Issue number | 3 |
| Publication status | Published - Dec 2018 |
Keywords
- Rules
- Legal indeterminacy
- First-order reasoning
- Second-order reasoning
- Regularity