Cartel deterrence and the labour market for managers

Ricardo Gonçalves; Miguel A. Fonseca; Joana Pinho; Giovanni Tabacco

Cartel deterrence and the labour market for managers

Ricardo Gonçalves, Miguel A. Fonseca, Joana Pinho, Giovanni Tabacco

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Chapter

Abstract

This chapter examines the impact of different antitrust regimes on deterring cartel behaviour. It presents the results of a laboratory experiment that sheds light on how competing regulatory frameworks may affect managers’ incentives to collude and, in turn, managers’ labour markets.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	Delivering better policies through behavioural insights
Subtitle of host publication	new approaches
Publisher	OECD
Chapter	4
Pages	73-115
Number of pages	43
ISBN (Print)	9789264555730
Publication status	Published - 2019

UN SDGs

This output contributes to the following UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)

Cite this

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M3 - Chapter

SN - 9789264555730

SP - 73

EP - 115

BT - Delivering better policies through behavioural insights

PB - OECD

ER -

Cartel deterrence and the labour market for managers

Abstract

UN SDGs

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