Collusion between two-sided platforms

Yassine Lefouili*, Joana Pinho*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

9 Citations (Scopus)
14 Downloads

Abstract

We study the price and welfare effects of collusion between two-sided platforms and show that they depend on whether collusion occurs on both sides or a single side of the market, and whether users single-home or multi-home. Our most striking result is that one-sided collusion leads to lower (resp. higher) prices on the collusive (resp. competitive) side if the cross-group externalities exerted on the collusive side are positive and sufficiently strong. One-sided collusion may, therefore, benefit the users on the collusive side and harm the users on the competitive side. Our findings have implications regarding cartel detection and damages actions.
Original languageEnglish
Article number102656
JournalInternational Journal of Industrial Organization
Volume72
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Sept 2020

Keywords

  • Collusion
  • Cross-group externalities
  • Two-sided markets

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