Competition for market share or for market size: oligopolistic equilibria with varying competitive toughness

Claude D'Aspremont*, Rodolphe dos Santos Ferreira, Louis André Gérard-Varet

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

24 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

For an industry producing a composite commodity, we propose a comprehensive concept of oligopolistic equilibrium, allowing for a parameterized continuum of regimes varying in competitive toughness. Each firm sets simultaneously its price and its quantity under two constraints, relative to its market share and to market size. The price and the quantity equilibrium outcomes always belong to the set of oligopolistic equilibria. When firms are identical and we let their number increase, any sequence of symmetric oligopolistic equilibria converges to the monopolistic competition outcome. Further results are derived in the symmetric CES case, concerning in particular the collusive solution enforceability.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)761-784
Number of pages24
JournalInternational Economic Review
Volume48
Issue number3
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Aug 2007
Externally publishedYes

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