TY - JOUR
T1 - Costly horizontal differentiation
AU - Correia-da-Silva, João
AU - Pinho, Joana
N1 - Funding Information:
Acknowledgements We thank Frago Kourandi, Odd Rune Straume (Editor) and three anonymous referees for useful comments and suggestions which allowed us to improve this paper. João Correia-da-Silva ([email protected]) acknowledges support from Fundação para a Ciência e Tec-nologia and FEDER (research grant PTDC/EGE-ECO/108331/2008) and from CEF.UP. Joana Pinho ([email protected]) acknowledges support from Fundação para a Ciência e Tecnologia (Ph.D. scholarship).
Copyright:
Copyright 2011 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved.
PY - 2011/12
Y1 - 2011/12
N2 - We study the effect of quadratic differentiation costs in the Hotelling model of endogenous product differentiation. The equilibrium location choices are found to depend on the magnitude of the differentiation costs (relatively to the transportation costs supported by consumers). When the differentiation costs are low, there is maximum differentiation. When they are high, there is partial differentiation, with a degree of differentiation that decreases with the differentiation costs. In any case, the socially optimal degree of differentiation is always lower than the equilibrium level. We also study the case of collusion between firms. If firms can combine locations but not prices, they locate asymmetrically when differentiation costs are high and choose maximum differentiation when they are low. When collusion extends to price setting, there is partial differentiation.
AB - We study the effect of quadratic differentiation costs in the Hotelling model of endogenous product differentiation. The equilibrium location choices are found to depend on the magnitude of the differentiation costs (relatively to the transportation costs supported by consumers). When the differentiation costs are low, there is maximum differentiation. When they are high, there is partial differentiation, with a degree of differentiation that decreases with the differentiation costs. In any case, the socially optimal degree of differentiation is always lower than the equilibrium level. We also study the case of collusion between firms. If firms can combine locations but not prices, they locate asymmetrically when differentiation costs are high and choose maximum differentiation when they are low. When collusion extends to price setting, there is partial differentiation.
KW - Collusion
KW - Costly product differentiation
KW - Hotelling model
KW - Spatial competition
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=81255195811&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1007/s10258-010-0066-4
DO - 10.1007/s10258-010-0066-4
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:81255195811
SN - 1617-982X
VL - 10
SP - 165
EP - 188
JO - Portuguese Economic Journal
JF - Portuguese Economic Journal
IS - 3
ER -