Democracia e legitimidade na União Europeia: a escolha do presidente da Comissão Europeia

The Treaty of Lisbon introduced changes to the rules for the election of the President of the Commission, stating that he would be elected by the European Parliament on a proposal from the European Council. It was in this institutional context that European political parties took the initiative to present candidates for the post of President of the European Commission before the European elections of 2014. This procedure, which was not expressly provided for in the Treaty, had for its defenders the objective of creating a greater link between the European Parliament elections and the choice of the President of the Commission in order to increase the interest in the elections and to confer greater legitimacy and democraticity in the process of choosing the President of the European Commission. In pursuit of this aim, the European political parties were encouraged by the European Parliament and the Commission. The political and academic debate has long discussed the so-called democratic deficit of the European Union, its causes and the most appropriate ways of solving it. The positions taken on this subject are largely revealing of the political perspectives or the privileged European integration theories, which we can divide into two broad fields: supranationalism and intergovernmentalism. For some time now, an academic trend has come from a supranationalist perspective, to advocate for greater politicization and closer links between the European elections and the choice of a European executive as a way of responding to the democratic deficit. This thesis aims to analyze whether this objective has in fact been achieved in the 2014 European Parliament elections and whether this will be the most appropriate path to strengthen legitimacy and democracy in a polity with the characteristics of the European Union.