Consciência egológica e Ichlosen Subjektivität em Edmund Husserl

This paper addresses a particular aspect of the phenomenological theory of consciousness, as is was formulated by Edmund Husserl. Husserl stresses the fact that the foundational principals of the empirical sciences have their place in pure consciousness. We tried to understand, in the first place, what Husserl means by consciousness, beginning with the Logical Investigations, i.e. before the so-called «transcendental turn», next, in the Göttingen course intitled An Introduction to Logic and Theory of Knowledge, contemporary of this turn and a public testemony of it, and at last in Ideas I and Ideas II, where it is already accomplished. A second nucleous of problems regards the necessity of introducing in the activity of consciousness a pure Ego, i.e. an identity pole, modifying the former thesis according to which the Ego has only an empirical character. In the paper we try to grasp the meaning of Hussel’s resistencies againsts the hypothesis of a pure Ego before the «transcendental turn», and to understand the meaning of the concept of intentional imanence as a solution to the problem of constitution of objectivities. A third nucleous, although more briefly addressed, regards the phenomenological notion of a transcendental Ego, what connects and at the same time distinguishes it from the kantian «I think».