Estimating judicial ideal points in the Spanish Supreme Court: the case of administrative review

Lucia Dalla Pellegrina; Nuno Garoupa; Fernando Gómez-Pomar

doi:10.1016/j.irle.2017.07.003

Estimating judicial ideal points in the Spanish Supreme Court: the case of administrative review

Lucia Dalla Pellegrina^*
, Nuno Garoupa
, Fernando Gómez-Pomar

^*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

20 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper presents an estimation of ideal points for the Justices of the Supreme Court of Spain in the specific area of administrative review for the period 2000–2008, controlling for dissent suppression effort. The estimated ideal points allow us to identify political clusters in the Supreme Court which seem inconsistent with the formal and traditional views that a career judiciary is politically not strongly aligned. At the same time, we find evidence that confirms a trend favoring consensus and dissent avoidance.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	16-28
Number of pages	13
Journal	International Review of Law and Economics
Volume	52
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.irle.2017.07.003
Publication status	Published - Oct 2017

Keywords

Career judiciary
Dissent avoidance
Empirical legal studies
Ideal point
Ideology
Judicial behavior
Spanish supreme court

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10.1016/j.irle.2017.07.003

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abstract = "This paper presents an estimation of ideal points for the Justices of the Supreme Court of Spain in the specific area of administrative review for the period 2000{\textendash}2008, controlling for dissent suppression effort. The estimated ideal points allow us to identify political clusters in the Supreme Court which seem inconsistent with the formal and traditional views that a career judiciary is politically not strongly aligned. At the same time, we find evidence that confirms a trend favoring consensus and dissent avoidance.",

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KW - Dissent avoidance

KW - Empirical legal studies

KW - Ideal point

KW - Ideology

KW - Judicial behavior

KW - Spanish supreme court

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Estimating judicial ideal points in the Spanish Supreme Court: the case of administrative review

Abstract

Keywords

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