Eternismo metafísico

This paper will focus on metaphysical eternalism, explaining what the view is and discussing the main arguments for it. Our main goal is to introduce metaphysical eternalism and to identify its pros and cons. Metaphysical eternalism claims that there is no ontological difference between objects and events that are in the past, present, or future, i.e., any difference there may be between an event in the future and an event occurring now will have nothing to do with the existence of one as against the other. Naturally, the same could be said, from an eternalist point of view, about objects and events in the past. Arguments in defense of this view include, among others, McTaggart’s argument against the passage of time; the impossibility of there being relations between existent objects and events (those which are present) and non-existent ones (those which are in the past or in the future, according to non-eternalists); and the implications of the relativity of simultaneity. This paper will discuss these arguments and the answers given to them by those who challenge eternalism, in five sections. In the first one, we will introduce the eternalist theory and the reasons to profess it. In the second section, we will move to the possible answers given by non-eternalists, especially presentists, against eternalist arguments. In the third section, we will consider how intelligible this debate is. In the fourth section, we will consider and discuss some philosophical models and their relations to the main debate. In the last section, we will make some general comments on the current state of the debate about eternalism, focusing on the benefits, challenges, and disadvantages of this theory.