Experimental evidence on English auctions: oral outcry versus clock

Ricardo Gonçalves*, John Hey

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper tests experimentally, in a common value setting, the equivalence between the Japanese English auction (or clock auction) and an oral outcry auction where bidders are allowed to call their own bids. We find that (i) bidding behaviour is different in each type of auction, but also that (ii) this difference in bidding behaviour does not affect significantly the auction prices. This lends some support to the equivalence between these two types of auction. The winner's curse is present: overbidding led to higher than expected prices (under Nash bidding strategies) in both types of auction. Although interesting and encouraging, the results clearly indicate that further research is necessary, particularly with a modified experimental design.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)313-352
Number of pages40
JournalBulletin of Economic Research
Volume63
Issue number4
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Oct 2011

Keywords

  • Discrete bidding
  • English auctions
  • Winner's curse

Fingerprint

Dive into the research topics of 'Experimental evidence on English auctions: oral outcry versus clock'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this