Experimental evidence on english auctions: oral outcry versus clock

Ricardo Gonçalves*, John Hey

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapterpeer-review


This paper tests experimentally, in a common value setting, the equivalence between the Japanese English auction (or clock auction) and an oral outcry auction where bidders are allowed to call their own bids. We find that (i) bidding behaviour is different in each type of auction, but also that (ii) this difference in bidding behaviour does not affect significantly the auction prices. This lends some support to the equivalence between these two types of auction. The winner's curse is present: overbidding led to higher than expected prices (under Nash bidding strategies) in both types of auction. Although interesting and encouraging, the results clearly indicate that further research is necessary, particularly with a modified experimental design.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationExperiments in economics
Subtitle of host publicationdecision making and markets
EditorsJohn D. Hey
PublisherWorld Scientific Publishing Co.
Number of pages40
ISBN (Electronic)9789813235816, 9789813235823
ISBN (Print)9789813235809
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jan 2018


  • Discrete bidding
  • English auctions
  • Winner's curse


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