Forest owners' collective action against the risk of forest fire: a game theoretical approach

Original language	Undefined/Unknown
Title of host publication	The Economics of Natural Hazards in Forestry
Publication status	Published - 2001

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Mendes, A. (2001). Forest owners' collective action against the risk of forest fire: a game theoretical approach. In The Economics of Natural Hazards in Forestry

Mendes, Américo. / Forest owners' collective action against the risk of forest fire: a game theoretical approach. The Economics of Natural Hazards in Forestry. 2001.

@inproceedings{2207c2bd1eb749dabb2e97365b7d3e39,

title = "Forest owners' collective action against the risk of forest fire: a game theoretical approach",

author = "Am{\'e}rico Mendes",

year = "2001",

language = "Undefined/Unknown",

booktitle = "The Economics of Natural Hazards in Forestry",

}

Mendes, A 2001, Forest owners' collective action against the risk of forest fire: a game theoretical approach. in The Economics of Natural Hazards in Forestry.

Forest owners' collective action against the risk of forest fire: a game theoretical approach. / Mendes, Américo.
The Economics of Natural Hazards in Forestry. 2001.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution › peer-review

TY - GEN

T1 - Forest owners' collective action against the risk of forest fire: a game theoretical approach

AU - Mendes, Américo

PY - 2001

Y1 - 2001

M3 - Conference contribution

BT - The Economics of Natural Hazards in Forestry

ER -

Mendes A. Forest owners' collective action against the risk of forest fire: a game theoretical approach. In The Economics of Natural Hazards in Forestry. 2001