Historical epistemology: a German connection

Thomas S. Kuhn gave a lecture on November 19, 1991, at Harvard University entitled “The Problem with the Historical Philosophy of Science” in which he analyzed the evolution of philosophy of science and its connection with history of science 30 years after the publication of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Kuhn’s verdict ought to be understood as the explicit exposition of his viewpoint on a problem raised by his masterpiece, the legitimization of relativism, seen as the central element in the historic and sociological approaches. Since the mid-1960s, many philosophers, sociologists, and historians of science have sought to overcome such resistances, seeking narratives that promote integration, like historical epistemology. Despite resorting to numerous sources and immersed in the historicist tradition, historical epistemology consciously intends to avoid a relativistic interpretation of the construction and definition of scientific knowledge. Our contribution has two main objectives. First to (re)introduce historical epistemology in the context of discussions that began in the 1960s, a time when relativism “invaded” the domains of philosophy, history, and sociology of science, not leaving them since then. In other words, we intend to analyze whether or not the goal of proposing rational reconstructions of the scientific past is actually achieved as advocated by historical epistemology. The second central theme we discuss concerns the formulation of a critical analysis as built from a Latin American perspective on historical epistemology in order to contribute to the development of a practice in history of science more suited to our realities.