Irrationality in English auctions

Ricardo Gonçalves*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

5 Citations (Scopus)


This paper explores the effects of a particular form of irrational behaviour by participating bidders in a common value English auction. We allow bidders to update their expected valuation of the good as the current price increases, assuming that their opponents always play the symmetric Nash equilibrium. When only one bidder adopts this type of behaviour, it is ambiguous whether the final auction price is higher or lower than at the symmetric equilibrium. However, when both bidders behave irrationally, the final auction price is never lower than the symmetric equilibrium provided bidders "match" their strategies.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)180-192
Number of pages13
JournalJournal of Economic Behavior and Organization
Issue number1
Publication statusPublished - Jul 2008


  • Asymmetric equilibrium
  • English auctions
  • Irrationality


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