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Joint-liability with endogenously asymmetric group loan contracts
Francesco Carli
*
, Burak R. Uras
*
Corresponding author for this work
Research output
:
Contribution to journal
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Article
›
peer-review
2
Citations (Scopus)
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Business & Economics
Joint Liability
100%
Peer Monitoring
72%
Microfinance Institutions
51%
Loans
51%
Group Lending
33%
Monitoring
33%
Principal-agent Model
27%
Optimal Contract
26%
Incentives
23%
Asymmetry
21%
Breakdown
21%
Nash Equilibrium
20%
Lending
19%
Peers
19%
Profit
12%
Social Sciences
loan
66%
liability
61%
monitoring
39%
microfinance
36%
lending
30%
optimal contract
25%
principal-agent model
21%
Group
20%
asymmetry
13%
profit
11%
incentive
10%
leader
8%
Earth & Environmental Sciences
liability
80%
contract
66%
microfinance
57%
monitoring
35%
organization
24%
profit
17%
incentive
16%
asymmetry
15%
rate
5%