Skip to main navigation Skip to search Skip to main content

Liquidity risk and collective moral hazard

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

8 Citations (Scopus)
21 Downloads

Abstract

Banks individually optimize their liquidity risk management, often neglecting the externalities generated by their choices on the overall risk of the financial system. However, banks may have incentives to optimize their choices not strictly at the individual level, but engaging instead in collective risk-taking strategies. In this paper we look for evidence of such behaviors in the run-up to the global financial crisis. We find strong and robust evidence of peer effects in banks’ liquidity risk management. This suggests that incentives for collective risk-taking play a role in banks’ choices, thus calling for a macroprudential approach to liquidity regulation.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)101-150
Number of pages50
JournalInternational Journal of Central Banking
Volume15
Issue number2
Publication statusPublished - Jun 2019

UN SDGs

This output contributes to the following UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)

  1. SDG 10 - Reduced Inequalities
    SDG 10 Reduced Inequalities

Fingerprint

Dive into the research topics of 'Liquidity risk and collective moral hazard'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this