@article{18ff824fa59f469389b991e1f8f88c53,
title = "Measuring unilateral effects in partial horizontal acquisitions",
abstract = "Recent years have witnessed an increased interest, by competition agencies, in assessing the competitive effects of partial acquisitions. We propose an empirical structural methodology to examine quantitatively the unilateral impact of partial horizontal acquisitions. The acquisitions may be direct or indirect, and may or may not correspond to control. The proposed methodology simulates the effects on prices, market shares, firm profits and consumer welfare. It can deal with differentiated product industries and nest full mergers as a special case. We provide an empirical application to several acquisitions in the wet shaving industry.",
keywords = "Antitrust, Demand estimation, Differentiated products, Oligopoly, Partial acquisitions, Unilateral effects",
author = "Duarte Brito and Ricardo Ribeiro and Helder Vasconcelos",
note = "Funding Information: We would like to thank the Editor, Pierre Dubois, and two anonymous referees for their thorough and thoughtful reports. We would also like to thank Stephane Caprice and Natalia Fabra, as well as numerous participants at the XXVII Jornadas de Econom{\'i}a Industrial and seminars participants at Toulouse School of Economics and Universidade Cat{\'o}lica Portuguesa, for helpful comments and suggestions. We are grateful to the James M. Kilts Center for Marketing, University of Chicago Booth School of Business for sharing the data and to Funda{\c c}{\~a}o para a Ci{\^e}ncia e a Tecnologia for financial support (PTDC/EGE-ECO/099784/2008 and programme FEDER/POCI 2010). All remaining errors are of course our own. ",
year = "2014",
month = mar,
doi = "10.1016/j.ijindorg.2013.12.003",
language = "English",
volume = "33",
pages = "22--36",
journal = "International Journal of Industrial Organization",
issn = "0167-7187",
publisher = "Elsevier Inc.",
number = "1",
}
