Measuring unilateral effects in partial horizontal acquisitions

Duarte Brito, Ricardo Ribeiro*, Helder Vasconcelos

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

21 Citations (Scopus)


Recent years have witnessed an increased interest, by competition agencies, in assessing the competitive effects of partial acquisitions. We propose an empirical structural methodology to examine quantitatively the unilateral impact of partial horizontal acquisitions. The acquisitions may be direct or indirect, and may or may not correspond to control. The proposed methodology simulates the effects on prices, market shares, firm profits and consumer welfare. It can deal with differentiated product industries and nest full mergers as a special case. We provide an empirical application to several acquisitions in the wet shaving industry.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)22-36
Number of pages15
JournalInternational Journal of Industrial Organization
Issue number1
Publication statusPublished - Mar 2014


  • Antitrust
  • Demand estimation
  • Differentiated products
  • Oligopoly
  • Partial acquisitions
  • Unilateral effects


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