Modeling competition over multiple variables under limited consumer awareness

Samir Mamadehussene*, Francisco Silva

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

1 Citation (Scopus)


When analyzing firm competition over two strategic variables (e.g., quality and price), it is important to decide whether to model it as a one-stage or a two-stage game. Our analysis focuses on markets in which consumers are not aware of all alternatives. We find that, if consumers are sufficiently unaware, both the one-stage and the two-stage equilibria of the game that explicitly models limited awareness are close to the one-stage equilibrium of the standard game, which assumes full awareness. Therefore, markets in which consumers have limited awareness can be studied with standard models, provided that the one-stage game is analyzed.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)192-211
Number of pages20
JournalJournal of Industrial Economics
Issue number1
Publication statusPublished - Mar 2023
Externally publishedYes


Dive into the research topics of 'Modeling competition over multiple variables under limited consumer awareness'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this