O fatalismo relativístico

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

In this article, I will argue that the argument for fatalism based on the relativity of simultaneity (RoS) fails. The original proponents of the argument (Rietdijk 1966, Putnam 1967 and Penrose 1989) called the thesis in terms of ‘determinism’, but Levin (Levin 2007) refers to it as ‘relativistic fatalism’. Relativistic fatalism is a view supported by the alleged dependence of the property of being future on an arbitrary choice of some coordinate system. First I will try to explain the classic argument, attributed to it a dialectic that justified to call it in the same terms as Levin did. Subsequently, I will refuse the relativistic fatalism using many strategies to deal with it.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)231–247
Number of pages17
JournalPrincipia
Volume23
Issue number2
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 16 Aug 2019
Externally publishedYes

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