Oligopolistic competition as a common agency game

Claude d'Aspremont*, Rodolphe dos Santos Ferreira

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

8 Citations (Scopus)


Oligopolistic competition is analyzed in a complete information multi-principal common agency framework, where principals are firms supplying differentiated goods and the agent is a representative consumer. We first propose a canonical formulation of common agency games, and a parameterization of the set of equilibria based on the Lagrange multipliers associated with the participation and the incentive compatibility constraints of each principal. This is used to characterize the set of equilibria in the intrinsic and non-intrinsic games. The former includes the latter, as well as the standard price and quantity equilibrium outcomes. It may also include the collusive solution.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)21-33
Number of pages13
JournalGames and Economic Behavior
Issue number1
Publication statusPublished - Sept 2010
Externally publishedYes


  • Common agency
  • Competitive toughness
  • Oligopolistic competition
  • Tacit collusion


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