On the superiority of the multiple round ascending bid auction

Fernando Branco

doi:10.1016/S0165-1765(00)00340-2

On the superiority of the multiple round ascending bid auction

Fernando Branco^*

^*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

6 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

I compare the equilibria of standard auctions for two objects when there are unit and bundle bidders. In the example considered, the multiple round ascending bid auction performs better than the other mechanisms in both revenue and efficiency.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	187-194
Number of pages	8
Journal	Economics Letters
Volume	70
Issue number	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/S0165-1765(00)00340-2
Publication status	Published - Feb 2001

Keywords

D44
FCC auctions

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10.1016/S0165-1765(00)00340-2

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title = "On the superiority of the multiple round ascending bid auction",

abstract = "I compare the equilibria of standard auctions for two objects when there are unit and bundle bidders. In the example considered, the multiple round ascending bid auction performs better than the other mechanisms in both revenue and efficiency.",

keywords = "D44, FCC auctions",

author = "Fernando Branco",

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KW - FCC auctions

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DO - 10.1016/S0165-1765(00)00340-2

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JO - Economics Letters

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On the superiority of the multiple round ascending bid auction

Abstract

Keywords

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