Perturbed cusp catastrophe in a population game: spatial economics with locational asymmetries

Kiyohiro Ikeda*, Yuki Takayama, José M. Gaspar, Minoru Osawa

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

This paper studies the cusp catastrophe in a two-strategy population game with exogenous locational asymmetries and its application to spatial economics. We derive approximating games of two kinds: a cusp catastrophe form and a more general form. As a novel contribution of this paper, the effects of an arbitrary number of regional asymmetries are expressed using only three asymmetry parameters, thereby allowing for an analytical analysis. We find a new behavior with hysteresis using the general form. The usefulness of the forms is demonstrated for two economic geography models. A numerical recipe is presented to construct the cusp catastrophe form.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)961-980
Number of pages20
JournalJournal of Regional Science
Volume62
Issue number4
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Sept 2022

Keywords

  • Cusp catastrophe
  • Exogenous asymmetries
  • Hysteresis
  • Perturbed pitchfork bifurcation
  • Spatial economics
  • Two-strategy population game
  • Universal unfolding

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