Phenomenology revisited

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapterpeer-review


In 1929 things changed for Ortega regarding his relation to phenomenology: the ultimate evidence of “my life” cannot be attained by the phenomenological method. In fact, according to Ortega, the method is based on reflection, i.e., an activity intended to grasp the primordial executive activity of consciousness (or, as Ortega likes to say, of “human individual life”), and not on that activity itself. The chapter evaluates this criticism, how far he misinterpreted Husserl’s notion of reflection and its aim in Ideas I, and shows its permanence in Ortega’s own evaluation of his relations both with Neokantianism and phenomenology in the late 1940s, namely, in the unfinished book The Idea of Principle in Leibniz.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationThe philosophy of Ortega y Gasset reevaluated
EditorsCarlos Morujão, Samuel Dimas, Susana Relvas
Number of pages9
ISBN (Electronic)9783030792497
ISBN (Print)9783030792480, 9783030792510
Publication statusPublished - 2021


Dive into the research topics of 'Phenomenology revisited'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this