TY - JOUR
T1 - Price-matching guarantees as a direct signal of low prices
AU - Mamadehussene, Samir
N1 - Funding Information:
I am grateful to Jeff Ely for many discussions that greatly improved the article. For their helpful comments, I also thank Chris Li, Wojciech Olszewski, Ricardo Pique, Tiago Pires, Robert Porter, Francisco Silva, and seminar participants at Northwestern University, University of California, Los Angeles, Católica Lisbon School of Business & Eco-nomics, Universidad Carlos III, California State University Fullerton, European Association for Research in Industrial Economics 2016, and International Industrial Organization Conference 2017. I thank the JMR review team for their helpful suggestions and comments on previous versions of this article. All errors are my own. The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: I acknowledge the support from FCT Portuguese Foundation of Science and Technology for the project UID/GES/00407/2013.
Funding Information:
The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: I acknowledge the support from FCT Portuguese Foundation of Science and Technology for the project UID/GES/00407/2013.
Publisher Copyright:
© American Marketing Association 2019.
PY - 2019/4
Y1 - 2019/4
N2 - If consumers believe that stores offering price-matching guarantees (PMGs) charge low prices, high-search-cost consumers will purchase from PMG stores. This leads PMG stores’ demand to be less price sensitive, which drives these stores to charge higher prices. The belief that PMG stores charge low prices paradoxically leads them to charge high prices. For this reason, the literature finds that PMGs can only signal low prices when firm heterogeneity is sufficiently large. Because PMGs are offered by retailers that purchase the same product from the same producer, large firm heterogeneity may be a strong assumption. This article proposes a theory that explains how homogeneous firms may signal their low prices through PMGs: consumers perceive PMG stores to have lower prices not because they expect them to have low marginal costs or service quality, but simply because they offer a PMG.
AB - If consumers believe that stores offering price-matching guarantees (PMGs) charge low prices, high-search-cost consumers will purchase from PMG stores. This leads PMG stores’ demand to be less price sensitive, which drives these stores to charge higher prices. The belief that PMG stores charge low prices paradoxically leads them to charge high prices. For this reason, the literature finds that PMGs can only signal low prices when firm heterogeneity is sufficiently large. Because PMGs are offered by retailers that purchase the same product from the same producer, large firm heterogeneity may be a strong assumption. This article proposes a theory that explains how homogeneous firms may signal their low prices through PMGs: consumers perceive PMG stores to have lower prices not because they expect them to have low marginal costs or service quality, but simply because they offer a PMG.
KW - Price-matching guarantees
KW - Search
KW - Signaling
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85069436576&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1177/0022243718821666
DO - 10.1177/0022243718821666
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85069436576
SN - 0022-2437
VL - 56
SP - 245
EP - 258
JO - Journal of Marketing Research
JF - Journal of Marketing Research
IS - 2
ER -