Sequential auctions with synergies: an example

Fernando Branco

doi:10.1016/s0165-1765(97)00013-x

Sequential auctions with synergies: an example

Fernando Branco^*

^*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

39 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

An equilibrium in an example of a two unit sequential ascending price auction where some bidders have superadditive values is presented. The equilibrium is in pure strategies. In equilibrium the expected price declines from the first to the second auction.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	159-163
Number of pages	5
Journal	Economics Letters
Volume	54
Issue number	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-1765(97)00013-x
Publication status	Published - Feb 1997

Keywords

Declining price anomaly
Sequential auctions

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title = "Sequential auctions with synergies: an example",

abstract = "An equilibrium in an example of a two unit sequential ascending price auction where some bidders have superadditive values is presented. The equilibrium is in pure strategies. In equilibrium the expected price declines from the first to the second auction.",

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author = "Fernando Branco",

year = "1997",

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DO - 10.1016/s0165-1765(97)00013-x

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JO - Economics Letters

JF - Economics Letters

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Sequential auctions with synergies: an example

Abstract

Keywords

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