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Sovereign default: the role of expectations

  • João Ayres
  • , Gaston Navarro
  • , Juan Pablo Nicolini
  • , Pedro Teles*
  • *Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

29 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

In the standard model of sovereign default, as in Aguiar and Gopinath (2006) or Arellano (2008), default is driven by fundamentals alone. There is no independent role for expectations. We show that small variations of that model are consistent with multiple interest rate equilibria, similar to the ones found in Calvo (1988). For distributions of output that are commonly used in the literature, the high interest rate equilibria have properties that make them fragile. Once output is drawn from a distribution with both good and bad times, however, it is possible to have robust high interest rate equilibria.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)803-812
Number of pages10
JournalJournal of Economic Theory
Volume175
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - May 2018

UN SDGs

This output contributes to the following UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)

  1. SDG 17 - Partnerships for the Goals
    SDG 17 Partnerships for the Goals

Keywords

  • Good and bad times
  • Multiple equilibria
  • Sovereign default

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