The adoption of remedies under regulation 1/2003: between success and coherence*

Regulation 1/2003 allows the European Commission to adopt structural and behavioural remedies when it finds that an undertaking has abused its dominant position. Notwithstanding, the Regulation lacks sufficient rules to guide the institu-tion’s decision-making activity or to help undertakings predict the consequences of their behaviour. This article’s purpose is to take stock of the Commission’s practice in imposing or accepting remedies so far, by discussing the limits to the Commission’s activity and the paths it may take when adopting remedies in antitrust cases. The first part will be the introduction to the topic. In the second part, it will be proposed that the main drivers of the Commission when adopting remedies are three-fold: the goals of EU competition law; the general objectives of EU competition law enforcement; and the specific objectives to be pursued by the remedy vis-à-vis the infringement, which will largely depend on the circum-stances of the case, the market and the type of abuse. In the third part, it will be submitted that the Commission’s activity is limited by the requirements that must govern the decision of adopting remedies: effectiveness, pro-portionality, timeliness and legal certainty. In the fourth part, it will be submitted that the actual choice of remedies depends on the type of infringement, procedure (whether article 7 or article 9 of Regulation 1/2003) and the market. The focus will be on energy and digital markets: the former to illustrate cases of commitment decisions, the latter to figure out the adequacy of the application of remedies in dynamic markets. In the fifth part, the article will consider whether the current legal framework is suited to the adoption of remedies in a continuous changing environment or some changes are required. The sixth part will be the conclusion.