The dark triad: private benefits of control, voting caps and the mandatory takeover rule

Research output: Working paper

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Abstract

This paper takes as an example the intertwined relations between Grupo Espírito Santo and Portugal Telecom and the events surrounding the unpaid Rioforte loan to describe minority blockholders’ strong incentives to protect the extraction of private benefits of control when a third party threatens a company takeover. This paper argues that the combination of the extraction of private benefits of control, the takeover protection granted by a statutory voting rights ceiling provision and the existence of a mandatory takeover rule create a vicious circle with an unintended outcome. Although a mandatory takeover rule should protect minority shareholders, it instead works in favour of the blockholder extracting private benefits of control, which is the exact opposite of its original intent.
Original languageEnglish
PublisherUniversidade Católica Portuguesa
Number of pages31
Publication statusPublished - 2023

Publication series

NameCGSL Working Papers
No.1

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