The profit-sharing rule that maximizes sustainability of cartel agreements

João Correia-da-Silva, Joana Pinho*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

3 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We study the profit-sharing rule that maximizes the sustainability of cartel agreements when firms can make side-payments. This rule is such that the critical discount factor is the same for all firms ("balanced temptation"). If a cartel applies this rule, contrarily to the typical finding in the literature, asymmetries among firms may increase the sustainability of the cartel. In an illustrating example of a Cournot duopoly with asymmetric production costs, the sustainability of collusion is maximal when firms are extremely asymmetric.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)143-151
Number of pages9
JournalJournal of Dynamics and Games
Volume3
Issue number2
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Apr 2016
Externally publishedYes

Keywords

  • Asymmetric firms
  • Balanced temptation
  • Collusion
  • Critical discount factor
  • Side-payments

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