A remuneração dos administradores à luz da teoria da agência : as práticas adotadas em Portugal

  • Gonçalo André Silva Martinho (Student)

Student thesis: Master's Thesis


This dissertation is centered around the Agency Theory as an economic rationale explaining the emergence of conflicts of interest in the relation between shareholders and executive board members. We try to demonstrate the importance of the remuneration of the latter, as a mechanism able to mitigate agency problems, giving special emphasis to the variable component of the remuneration as a mechanism of alignment of interests and, as well as, of improvement of the performance of the company, in the short and long term. In addition, we will study the competent bodies to set the remuneration policy for executives, emphasizing the Remuneration Committee as the body best equipped to perform these functions in comparison to other alternatives, analysing the practices of 5 Portuguese companies in this area. We will also reflect on the remuneration structure itself, in which we will address the criteria used to determine the variable component of the remuneration in view of the risks it presents, highlighting the importance of objective and pre-defined criteria that guide the executives’ actions. Finally, we will underline the legal and recommendatory limits to private autonomy in terms of remuneration structure, commenting on them, culminating in an analysis of the remuneration structures adopted in Portuguese corporate practice, seeking to assess whether they adopt good governance practices.
Date of Award10 Mar 2023
Original languagePortuguese
Awarding Institution
  • Universidade Católica Portuguesa
SupervisorPaulo Câmara Pires dos Santos Martins (Supervisor)


  • Say on pay
  • Pay for performance
  • Executive compensation
  • Shareholders
  • Conflict of interests
  • Agency theory
  • Variable compensation
  • Remunerations committee
  • Compensation structure
  • KPI
  • Practices


  • Mestrado em Direito e Gestão

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