A remuneração dos administradores à luz da teoria da agência : as práticas adotadas em Portugal

Abstract

This dissertation is centered around the Agency Theory as an economic rationale explaining the emergence of conflicts of interest in the relation between shareholders and executive board members. We try to demonstrate the importance of the remuneration of the latter, as a mechanism able to mitigate agency problems, giving special emphasis to the variable component of the remuneration as a mechanism of alignment of interests and, as well as, of improvement of the performance of the company, in the short and long term. In addition, we will study the competent bodies to set the remuneration policy for executives, emphasizing the Remuneration Committee as the body best equipped to perform these functions in comparison to other alternatives, analysing the practices of 5 Portuguese companies in this area. We will also reflect on the remuneration structure itself, in which we will address the criteria used to determine the variable component of the remuneration in view of the risks it presents, highlighting the importance of objective and pre-defined criteria that guide the executives’ actions. Finally, we will underline the legal and recommendatory limits to private autonomy in terms of remuneration structure, commenting on them, culminating in an analysis of the remuneration structures adopted in Portuguese corporate practice, seeking to assess whether they adopt good governance practices.

Date of Award	10 Mar 2023
Original language	Portuguese
Awarding Institution	Universidade Católica Portuguesa
Supervisor	Paulo Câmara Pires dos Santos Martins (Supervisor)