CEO compensation as a mechanism to induce firm performance

  • Manuel Joaquim Correia Tavares Costa (Student)

Student thesis: Master's Thesis

Abstract

Over the past few decades, academic literature, specifically on agency theory and executive compensation, has argued that CEO compensation should be aligned to firm performance in order to increase shareholder value. Nevertheless, some studies present the contrary idea, in which no link between performance and compensation can be established. This thesis analyses the relationship between firm performance and CEO compensation regarding Portuguese listed firms in the period of 2008-2013. No statistical evidence was found linking firm performance and CEO compensation, even after introducing governance and financial control variables as well as performing small sampling analysis of the top performers.
Date of Award8 Apr 2015
Original languageEnglish
Awarding Institution
  • Universidade Católica Portuguesa
SupervisorRicardo Reis (Supervisor)

Keywords

  • Executive compensation
  • Pay-performance relationship
  • Corporate Governance
  • Portugal

Designation

  • Mestrado em Finanças

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