Fixed-term contracts as screening devices

: causal evidence in a two-tier system

Abstract

The purpose of this dissertation is to access the impact stricter employment protection legislation on the use of fixed-term contracts as a screening device. To achieve this, I first confirm the results found by Centeno and Novo (2012) on the impact of the 2004 labor code reform over excess worker turnover and the share of fixed-term contracts on Portuguese firms, and then explore the link between those indicators and the transition of fixed-term to open-ended contracts. While the link between more stringent employment protection legislation and a higher reliance on fixed term contracts seems clear, the strategy of using fixed-term contracts as a screening device appears to be persistent, and more affected by idiosyncratic factors than external policy changes.

Date of Award	2013
Original language	English
Awarding Institution	Universidade Católica Portuguesa
Supervisor	Pedro Raposo (Supervisor)