Information asymmetry in public goods games

  • Max-Philipp Schmidt (Student)

Student thesis: Master's Thesis


In this study, the concept of basic income is treated as an information advantage lowering environmental uncertainty of future income. Decision-making is analyzed in the context of linear public goods games, following a novel theoretical setup that allows for the isolation of information asymmetry. Furthermore, a formula to quantify the information asymmetry is deduced. Research findings from two simulated public goods games indicate that exposing participants to less environmental uncertainty, in form of granting a basic income each period, leads to significantly lower voluntary contributions to the group account promoting opportunistic behavior. Also, evidence is found suggesting that the type of uncertainty and perceptions of fairness can influence this effect.
Date of Award26 Apr 2021
Original languageEnglish
Awarding Institution
  • Universidade Católica Portuguesa
SupervisorFilipa de Almeida (Supervisor)


  • Public-goods games
  • Basic income
  • Environmental uncertainty
  • Voluntary contribution mechanism
  • information asymmetry


  • Mestrado em Gestão e Administração de Empresas

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