Killer acquisitions e o atual regime do controlo das concentrações

Abstract

In 2018, a paperwork conducted and published by Colleen Cunningham, Florian Ederere Song Ma in the pharmaceutical sector elaborated and introduced a new theory of harm,according to which dominant firms acquire nascent firms with the sole purpose of discontinuing their innovative product - Killer Acquisitions. Said paperwork also evidenced that, by not meeting the ex-ante merger notification thresholds, these acquisitions have escaped the scrutiny of the competition authorities. Since then, the literature has shown that the concern with anti competitive effects of acquisitions of startups - even if in different contours than those of Killer Acquisitions - is not confined to the pharmaceutical sector, but also extends to other markets, particularly dynamic ones, such as the digital sector. As these concentrations have escaped administrative merger control,it is currently being discussed whether there is a trend towards the non-action of competition authorities in mergers involving start-ups, whether the situation should change and, if so, what measures should be adopted for the investigation, and prohibition,where necessary, of transactions involving such start-ups.

Date of Award	13 Jan 2023
Original language	Portuguese
Awarding Institution	Universidade Católica Portuguesa
Supervisor	Evaristo Mendes (Supervisor)