O problema de agência nas entidades bancárias

: o exemplo das políticas de remuneração dos administradores como mecanismo adequado a resolver conflitos de interesse

Abstract

With its historical roots dating back to the mensários of Rome, the Medieval Moneychangers or the Bankers of Florence, what is the complex financial and banking in general in our days is anything but simple, being composed of an increasing complexity also resulting from globalization that requires immediate and ready responses from the banking system itself to be given in almost any location on the globe. As a financial activity inherent to our reality, despite being spoken daily, and we all (directly or indirectly) have contact with it in our daily lives, the truth is that little is known about its concrete functioning and its nuances. Thus, among others, several questions arise, namely, what concerns the present study, specifically related to the agency problem and how it differs from the agency problems that also exist. In this sense, it is the purpose of the present study to give an overview of the functioning of the banking system but focusing its core on knowing to what extent the specificities of banking entities determine, or not, the emergence of branch problems in any way different (and deserving of other “combat mechanisms”) from those that may exist in other commercial societies.

Date of Award	11 Sept 2020
Original language	Portuguese
Awarding Institution	Universidade Católica Portuguesa
Supervisor	Daniela Furto Baptista (Supervisor)