Os conflitos entre acionistas e gestores à luz da teoria da agência

: mecanismos de controlo

Abstract

This dissertation focuses on an in-depth analysis of Agency Theory, an economic approach that provides a conceptual framework for understanding and resolving the conflicts that emerge in contemporary corporate structures as a result of the misalignment of interests between the principal and the agent. The scope of this study proposes to offer a critical and comprehensive view of the challenges inherent in agency conflicts between shareholders and managers in companies where the separation between ownership and control is manifest. Recognizing the complexity of modern corporate structures, this research explores the points of conflict between shareholders and managers, highlighting the relevance and effectiveness of corporate governance in mitigating the problems identified. The dissertation thus delves into a detailed analysis of the mechanisms for controlling the conduct of managers, preventing potential deviations from the social interest that could jeopardize the continuity and long-term sustainability of companies.

Date of Award	17 Dec 2025
Original language	Portuguese
Awarding Institution	Universidade Católica Portuguesa
Supervisor	Nuno Moreira da Cruz (Supervisor)