A new grounding problem for presentism

Elton Marques

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The presentist — if she wants her thesis to be consistent with venerable logical–semantic principles, namely, bivalence and excluded middle — must provide a convincing answer to the grounding problem. Given the idea — already present in classical antiquity — that truth supervenes on being, the grounding problem is used by the eternalist to accuse the presentist of not being in a position to offer an adequate ground for truths that concern the past or future. To address this problem, many thinkers evoke metaphysical doctrines regarding abstract object — a truth about Socrates does not include Socrates himself but only his essence or haecceity. Others seek present grounds for future or past truths — nomic presentism — while still others deny the semantic traditions in question or deny that truth supervenes on being. In this article, I present a new grounding problem to the presentist. Under the assumption that time is infinite, I claim that the presentist does not have at her disposal the foundations for truths that concern infinitely distant objects in the future. Moreover, I present a similar argument to refute 'temporalism', the thesis that at least some truths are temporally indexed. To conclude the argumentative phase, I evaluate the traditional presentist perspective that was advanced in some of the above responses to the typical versions of the problem. The objective is to show that the usual answers cannot address the new grounding problem. Accordingly, I conclude that eternalism is better positioned to provide a ground for some truths if time is infinite.
Idioma originalEnglish
Número de páginas23
RevistaLogic and Philosophy of Time
Número de emissão1
Estado da publicaçãoPublicado - 23 out. 2023

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