Apprehension of relations and predicative achievements in husserl's experience and judgment

The relation between chapter 3 of part I and chapter 1 of part II of Experience and Judgment raises one of the most interesting problems of this work. Husserl's success in articulating two different levels of intentional life is a challenge to the validity of his "genetic phenomenology. " We will show that, between §§33 and 57, Husserl addresses at least four different issues: (1) the distinction between "encounter " (Erfassung) and "knowledge " (Erkenntnis); (2) the teleological orientation of "encounter, " without which "knowledge " would be unexplainable; (3) the relation between inner and outer horizons (i.e. the integration of a thing in a web of relations with other things, as a process of constitution of its own identity); and (4) the "predicative achievement " (predikative Leistung), as a transformation of the thing into an object and of the inner and outer relations into an indefinite process of objective determination (according to the procedure: "and so on " [und so weiter]). Finally, we will show how, for Husserl, the kind of intentional life underlying the syntheses of identification with its specific logical meaning presupposes the level of passive experience.