Bank risk-taking and impaired monetary policy transmission

Philipp Koenig; Eva Schliephake

doi:10.2139/ssrn.3925073

Bank risk-taking and impaired monetary policy transmission

Philipp Koenig
, Eva Schliephake

Resultado de pesquisa: ???researchoutput.researchoutputtypes.workingpaper.preprint???

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Resumo

We consider a standard banking model with agency frictions to simultaneously study the weakening and reversal of monetary transmission and banks’ risk-taking in a low-interest environment. Both, weaker monetary transmission and higher risk-taking arise because lower policy rates impair banks’ net worth.The pass-through to deposit rates, the level of excess reserves and the extent of the agency problem between banks and depositors are crucial determinants of monetary transmission. If the deposit pass-through is sufficiently impaired, a reversal rate exists. For policy rates below the reversal rate further interest rate reductions lead to a disproportionate increase in risk-taking and a contraction in loan supply.<br>

Idioma original	English
Número de páginas	42
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3925073
Estado da publicação	Publicado - 20 set. 2021

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10.2139/ssrn.3925073Licença: Unspecified

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Políticas, mercado de crédito, e efeitos distributivos
Cerqueiro, G. (PI), Schliephake, E. (CoPI), Bonfim, D. (Investigador), Stahl, J. (PI) & Panetti, E. (Investigador)
Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia
1/01/21 → 31/12/23
Projeto
CUBE: Católica Lisbon Research Unit in Business and Economics
Machado, F. (PI), Aranda, A. M. (Investigador), Costa, A. I. D. A. (Investigador), Martins, A. P. (Investigador), Bernard, A. (Investigador), Fidalgo, A. (Investigador), Reis, C. (Investigador), Abecassis-Moedas, C. (Investigador), Santos, C. (Investigador), Tran, D. (Investigador), Fernandes, D. (Investigador), Bonfim, D. (Investigador), Schliephake, E. (Investigador), Kalogirou, F. (Investigador), Reis, F. (Investigador), Santos, F. (Investigador), Machado, F. (Investigador), Sguera, F. (Investigador), Cerqueiro, G. (Investigador), Reis, H. (Investigador), Barreto, I. (Investigador), Silva, J. (Investigador), Salvado, J. C. (Investigador), Neves, J. C. D. (Investigador), Gijsbrechts, J. (Investigador), Stahl, J. (Investigador), Guedes, J. C. (Investigador), Faias, J. (Investigador), Wagner, L. (Investigador), Correia, I. (Investigador), Saldanha, M. F. (Investigador), Fontes, J. C. (Investigador), Modesto, L. (Investigador), Meira, M. (Investigador), Matos, M. G. D. (Investigador), Gouveia, M. (Investigador), Kozeniauskas, N. (Investigador), Bertani, N. (Investigador), Couzoff, P. (Investigador), Barroso, P. (Investigador), Encarnação, P. (Investigador), Raposo, P. (Investigador), Teles, P. (Investigador), Bastos, W. (Investigador), Bohnsack, R. (Investigador), Vale, R. C. D. (Investigador), Ferreira, R. (Investigador), Lloyd-Braga, T. (Investigador), Ramus, T. (Investigador), Colaço, V. H. (Investigador), Cavicchini, A. (Investigador), Parada, P. (Investigador), Pieters, R. (Investigador), Pinto, F. S. (Investigador), Colaço, V. H. (Investigador) & Venter, Z. (Investigador)
1/01/20 → 31/12/25
Projeto

Bank risk-taking and impaired monetary policy transmission
Koenig, P. J. & Schliephake, E., jul. 2024, Em: International Journal of Central Banking. 20, 3, p. 257-302 46 p.
Resultado de pesquisa › revisão de pares

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Citação

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Bank risk-taking and impaired monetary policy transmission

Resumo

ODS da ONU

Acesso ao documento

Impressão digital

Projetos

Políticas, mercado de crédito, e efeitos distributivos

CUBE: Católica Lisbon Research Unit in Business and Economics

Resultado de pesquisa

Bank risk-taking and impaired monetary policy transmission

Citação