Resumo
Is behavioral integration (i.e., which occurs when a subject's assertion that p matches her nonverbal behavior) a necessary feature of belief in folk psychology? Our data from over 5,000 people across 26 samples, spanning 22 countries suggests that it is not. Given the surprising cross-cultural robustness of our findings, we argue that the types of evidence for the ascription of a belief are, at least in some circumstances, lexicographically ordered: assertions are first taken into account, and when an agent sincerely asserts that p, nonlinguistic behavioral evidence is disregarded. In light of this, we take ourselves to have discovered a universal principle governing the ascription of beliefs in folk psychology.
| Idioma original | English |
|---|---|
| Páginas (de-até) | 193-203 |
| Número de páginas | 11 |
| Revista | Thought |
| Volume | 6 |
| Número de emissão | 3 |
| DOIs | |
| Estado da publicação | Publicado - set. 2017 |
Impressão digital
Mergulhe nos tópicos de investigação de “Behavioral circumscription and the folk psychology of belief: a study in ethno-mentalizing“. Em conjunto formam uma impressão digital única.Citação
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