This study develops a problemistic (i.e., problem-oriented) approach to explore legal rule evolution. We draw on theories of organizations - in particular theories about organizational rules, but also theories from neighboring disciplines - to formulate hypotheses and develop models of the hazard rate of legal rule change. We propose that the evolution of a law can be seen as an interplay between rules and problems, and explore how changes to law can be produced by three problem-related mechanisms: problem attraction, problem recognition, and problem engagement. Our study suggests that the problemistic perspective can shed new light on the evolution of laws and of social institutions in general.
|Revista||Academy of Management Proceedings|
|Número de emissão||1|
|Estado da publicação||Publicado - 2008|
|Evento||68th Annual Meeting of the Academy of Management, AOM 2008 - Anaheim, CA|
Duração: 8 ago 2008 → 13 ago 2008