Collusion between two-sided platforms

Yassine Lefouili; Joana Pinho

doi:10.1016/j.ijindorg.2020.102656

Collusion between two-sided platforms

Yassine Lefouili^*, Joana Pinho^*

^*Autor correspondente para este trabalho

Resultado de pesquisa › revisão de pares

9 Citações (Scopus)

14 Transferências (Pure)

Resumo

We study the price and welfare effects of collusion between two-sided platforms and show that they depend on whether collusion occurs on both sides or a single side of the market, and whether users single-home or multi-home. Our most striking result is that one-sided collusion leads to lower (resp. higher) prices on the collusive (resp. competitive) side if the cross-group externalities exerted on the collusive side are positive and sufficiently strong. One-sided collusion may, therefore, benefit the users on the collusive side and harm the users on the competitive side. Our findings have implications regarding cartel detection and damages actions.

Idioma original	English
Número do artigo	102656
Revista	International Journal of Industrial Organization
Volume	72
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2020.102656
Estado da publicação	Publicado - set. 2020

Acesso ao documento

10.1016/j.ijindorg.2020.102656

20224262Accepted author manuscript, 775 KBLicença:

http://hdl.handle.net/10400.14/42736Licença:

Outros arquivos e links

http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85089488930&partnerID=8YFLogxK

CEGE: Research Center in Management and Economics
Silva, M. (Professor Catedrático), Sousa, R. (Professor Catedrático), Alves, P. (Professor Auxiliar), Madsen, A. (Professor Auxiliar Convidado), Lourenço, A. (Professor Associado), Carvalho, A. S. (Professor Associado), Andrade, A. (Professor Auxiliar), Silva, P. D. (Professor Associado), Vlačić, B. (Professor Auxiliar Convidado), Martins, C. (Professor Auxiliar Convidado), Gomes, C. (Investigador Auxiliar), Gevrek, Z. E. (Professor Auxiliar Convidado), Oliveira, F. G. D. (Professor Associado), Faria, G. (Professor Associado Convidado), Marreiros, H. (Bolseiro), Pinho, J. (Professor Auxiliar Convidado), Machado, J. (Professor Associado), Araújo, J. (Investigador Auxiliar), Pinto, J. (Professor Auxiliar), Rego, A. (Professor Catedrático), Gaspar, J. M. (Investigador Auxiliar), Corbo, L. (Professor Auxiliar Convidado), Costa, L. (Professor Associado), Fernandes, L. (Professor Auxiliar), Sottomayor, M. (Professor Auxiliar), Martins, N. (Professor Catedrático), Hernández-Marrero, P. (Investigador Auxiliar), Gonçalves, R. (Professor Associado), Ribeiro, R. (PI), Coelho, S. L. (Docente Assistente), Pereira, S. M. (Investigador Auxiliar), Silva, S. (Professor Associado), Rodrigues, V. (Professor Associado), Sotiros, D. G. (Investigador Auxiliar), Valverde, C. (Professor Auxiliar), Leitão, A. (Professor Auxiliar), Julião, J. (Professor Auxiliar), Tavares, M. (Professor Auxiliar), Lages, C. R. (Investigador Auxiliar), Elmashhara, M. G. (Investigador Auxiliar) & Teymourifar, A. (Investigador Auxiliar)
1/01/20 → 31/12/25
Projeto

Citação

@article{d7582927f4d34c59bf87064a3f4b8f51,

title = "Collusion between two-sided platforms",

abstract = "We study the price and welfare effects of collusion between two-sided platforms and show that they depend on whether collusion occurs on both sides or a single side of the market, and whether users single-home or multi-home. Our most striking result is that one-sided collusion leads to lower (resp. higher) prices on the collusive (resp. competitive) side if the cross-group externalities exerted on the collusive side are positive and sufficiently strong. One-sided collusion may, therefore, benefit the users on the collusive side and harm the users on the competitive side. Our findings have implications regarding cartel detection and damages actions.",

keywords = "Collusion, Cross-group externalities, Two-sided markets",

author = "Yassine Lefouili and Joana Pinho",

note = "Funding Information: A previous version of this paper was circulated under the title “Collusion in two-sided markets”. We would like to thank the Co-Editor, Julian Wright, and two anonymous referees for very helpful comments and suggestions. We are grateful to C{\'e}dric Argenton, Jo{\~a}o Correia-da-Silva, Carmen Garc{\'i}a, Bruno Jullien, Martin Peitz, Joana Resende, Maarteen Pieter Schinkel, H{\'e}lder Vasconcelos, Yaron Yehezkel and our audiences at SAET 2017, EARIE 2017, CRESSE 2018, PEJ 2018, the NoCeT and CBE Conference on Taxation and Regulation in the Digital Economy, the Tinbergen Institute Workshop on Competition Policy, and at seminars given at the University of Vigo, the University of Porto, the University of Minho, OXERA, and Cat{\'o}lica Porto Business School for valuable comments and discussions. The financial support of the NET Institute, www.netinst.org , the European Rese arch Council (ERC) under the European Union{\textquoteright}s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme (grant agreement No 670494), and the Funda{\c c}{\~a}o para a Ci{\^e}ncia e a Tecnologia (FCT) through a post-doctoral scholarship (BPD/79535/2011) is gratefully acknowledged. Yassine Lefouili acknowledges funding from ANR under grant ANR-17-EURE-0010 (Investissements d{\textquoteright}Avenir program). This work was also funded byFEDER (COMPETE) and Portuguese public funds (FCT), through projects UIDB/00731/2020 and NORTE-01-0145-FEDER-028540. Funding Information: A previous version of this paper was circulated under the title ?Collusion in two-sided markets?. We would like to thank the Co-Editor, Julian Wright, and two anonymous referees for very helpful comments and suggestions. We are grateful to C?dric Argenton, Jo?o Correia-da-Silva, Carmen Garc?a, Bruno Jullien, Martin Peitz, Joana Resende, Maarteen Pieter Schinkel, H?lder Vasconcelos, Yaron Yehezkel and our audiences at SAET 2017, EARIE 2017, CRESSE 2018, PEJ 2018, the NoCeT and CBE Conference on Taxation and Regulation in the Digital Economy, the Tinbergen Institute Workshop on Competition Policy, and at seminars given at the University of Vigo, the University of Porto, the University of Minho, OXERA, and Cat?lica Porto Business School for valuable comments and discussions. The financial support of the NET Institute, www.netinst.org, the European Rese arch Council (ERC) under the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme (grant agreement No 670494), and the Funda??o para a Ci?ncia e a Tecnologia (FCT) through a post-doctoral scholarship (BPD/79535/2011) is gratefully acknowledged. Yassine Lefouili acknowledges funding from ANR under grant ANR-17-EURE-0010 (Investissements d'Avenir program). This work was also funded byFEDER (COMPETE) and Portuguese public funds (FCT), through projects UIDB/00731/2020 and NORTE-01-0145-FEDER-028540. Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 2020 Elsevier B.V.",

year = "2020",

month = sep,

doi = "10.1016/j.ijindorg.2020.102656",

language = "English",

volume = "72",

journal = "International Journal of Industrial Organization",

issn = "0167-7187",

publisher = "Elsevier Inc.",

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TY - JOUR

T1 - Collusion between two-sided platforms

AU - Lefouili, Yassine

AU - Pinho, Joana

N1 - Funding Information: A previous version of this paper was circulated under the title “Collusion in two-sided markets”. We would like to thank the Co-Editor, Julian Wright, and two anonymous referees for very helpful comments and suggestions. We are grateful to Cédric Argenton, João Correia-da-Silva, Carmen García, Bruno Jullien, Martin Peitz, Joana Resende, Maarteen Pieter Schinkel, Hélder Vasconcelos, Yaron Yehezkel and our audiences at SAET 2017, EARIE 2017, CRESSE 2018, PEJ 2018, the NoCeT and CBE Conference on Taxation and Regulation in the Digital Economy, the Tinbergen Institute Workshop on Competition Policy, and at seminars given at the University of Vigo, the University of Porto, the University of Minho, OXERA, and Católica Porto Business School for valuable comments and discussions. The financial support of the NET Institute, www.netinst.org , the European Rese arch Council (ERC) under the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme (grant agreement No 670494), and the Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia (FCT) through a post-doctoral scholarship (BPD/79535/2011) is gratefully acknowledged. Yassine Lefouili acknowledges funding from ANR under grant ANR-17-EURE-0010 (Investissements d’Avenir program). This work was also funded byFEDER (COMPETE) and Portuguese public funds (FCT), through projects UIDB/00731/2020 and NORTE-01-0145-FEDER-028540. Funding Information: A previous version of this paper was circulated under the title ?Collusion in two-sided markets?. We would like to thank the Co-Editor, Julian Wright, and two anonymous referees for very helpful comments and suggestions. We are grateful to C?dric Argenton, Jo?o Correia-da-Silva, Carmen Garc?a, Bruno Jullien, Martin Peitz, Joana Resende, Maarteen Pieter Schinkel, H?lder Vasconcelos, Yaron Yehezkel and our audiences at SAET 2017, EARIE 2017, CRESSE 2018, PEJ 2018, the NoCeT and CBE Conference on Taxation and Regulation in the Digital Economy, the Tinbergen Institute Workshop on Competition Policy, and at seminars given at the University of Vigo, the University of Porto, the University of Minho, OXERA, and Cat?lica Porto Business School for valuable comments and discussions. The financial support of the NET Institute, www.netinst.org, the European Rese arch Council (ERC) under the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme (grant agreement No 670494), and the Funda??o para a Ci?ncia e a Tecnologia (FCT) through a post-doctoral scholarship (BPD/79535/2011) is gratefully acknowledged. Yassine Lefouili acknowledges funding from ANR under grant ANR-17-EURE-0010 (Investissements d'Avenir program). This work was also funded byFEDER (COMPETE) and Portuguese public funds (FCT), through projects UIDB/00731/2020 and NORTE-01-0145-FEDER-028540. Publisher Copyright: © 2020 Elsevier B.V.

PY - 2020/9

Y1 - 2020/9

N2 - We study the price and welfare effects of collusion between two-sided platforms and show that they depend on whether collusion occurs on both sides or a single side of the market, and whether users single-home or multi-home. Our most striking result is that one-sided collusion leads to lower (resp. higher) prices on the collusive (resp. competitive) side if the cross-group externalities exerted on the collusive side are positive and sufficiently strong. One-sided collusion may, therefore, benefit the users on the collusive side and harm the users on the competitive side. Our findings have implications regarding cartel detection and damages actions.

AB - We study the price and welfare effects of collusion between two-sided platforms and show that they depend on whether collusion occurs on both sides or a single side of the market, and whether users single-home or multi-home. Our most striking result is that one-sided collusion leads to lower (resp. higher) prices on the collusive (resp. competitive) side if the cross-group externalities exerted on the collusive side are positive and sufficiently strong. One-sided collusion may, therefore, benefit the users on the collusive side and harm the users on the competitive side. Our findings have implications regarding cartel detection and damages actions.

KW - Collusion

KW - Cross-group externalities

KW - Two-sided markets

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85089488930&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2020.102656

DO - 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2020.102656

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:85089488930

SN - 0167-7187

VL - 72

JO - International Journal of Industrial Organization

JF - International Journal of Industrial Organization

M1 - 102656

ER -

Collusion between two-sided platforms

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CEGE: Research Center in Management and Economics

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