Does vertical integration promote downstream incomplete collusion? An evaluation of static and dynamic stability

Mariana Cunha, Paula Sarmento

Resultado de pesquisarevisão de pares

2 Citações (Scopus)

Resumo

This paper analyzes the impact of vertical integration on the static and dynamic stability of downstream incomplete collusion. It is shown that a vertical merger between an upstream firm and a downstream cartel or fringe firm promotes downstream collusion, under certain conditions on the market size. However, for low downstream market concentration, a vertical merger with a cartel firm hinders collusion. Moreover, a welfare analysis shows that consumer surplus increases with the vertical merger because the merger partially eliminates the double marginalization problem.
Idioma originalEnglish
Páginas (de-até)1-38
Número de páginas38
RevistaJournal of Industry, Competition and Trade
Volume14
Número de emissão1
DOIs
Estado da publicaçãoPublicado - mar 2014
Publicado externamenteSim

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