Although significant progress has been made in various areas since the eruption of the financial and sovereign debt crises, EMU governance is still incomplete today. The incompleteness of EMU governance, notably in its economic sphere, leaves EMU vulnerable to adverse market and to political-economy pressures. This paper argues that the EU exit of the UK, which had negotiated an opt-out from the common currency already at Maastricht, may allow for more homogeneous preferences regarding the additional requirements on the economic union as to sustain monetary union. To that end it could facilitate decision-making and contribute to the completion of the governance of EMU, whose relevance as the core of the EU integration project Brexit has come to reinforce. The resilience of the Eurozone however continues to hinge importantly on the creation of adjustment capacity and ownership of reform at the member state level, for which it is important to have a cohesive approach to the completion of EMU and a less negative narrative on EU integration at the domestic levels.