TY - JOUR
T1 - Estimating judicial ideal points in the Spanish Supreme Court
T2 - the case of administrative review
AU - Pellegrina, Lucia Dalla
AU - Garoupa, Nuno
AU - Gómez-Pomar, Fernando
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2017 Elsevier Inc.
Copyright:
Copyright 2017 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved.
PY - 2017/10
Y1 - 2017/10
N2 - This paper presents an estimation of ideal points for the Justices of the Supreme Court of Spain in the specific area of administrative review for the period 2000–2008, controlling for dissent suppression effort. The estimated ideal points allow us to identify political clusters in the Supreme Court which seem inconsistent with the formal and traditional views that a career judiciary is politically not strongly aligned. At the same time, we find evidence that confirms a trend favoring consensus and dissent avoidance.
AB - This paper presents an estimation of ideal points for the Justices of the Supreme Court of Spain in the specific area of administrative review for the period 2000–2008, controlling for dissent suppression effort. The estimated ideal points allow us to identify political clusters in the Supreme Court which seem inconsistent with the formal and traditional views that a career judiciary is politically not strongly aligned. At the same time, we find evidence that confirms a trend favoring consensus and dissent avoidance.
KW - Career judiciary
KW - Dissent avoidance
KW - Empirical legal studies
KW - Ideal point
KW - Ideology
KW - Judicial behavior
KW - Spanish supreme court
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85025695364&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1016/j.irle.2017.07.003
DO - 10.1016/j.irle.2017.07.003
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85025695364
SN - 0144-8188
VL - 52
SP - 16
EP - 28
JO - International Review of Law and Economics
JF - International Review of Law and Economics
ER -